

MAY 9 1956

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Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000100120048-5

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about giveaways by the Eisenhower administration and former Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay.

I now see in the column The Political Mill, by Gould Lincoln, which appeared in the Washington Evening Star, that Mr. Rex Ellis, a well-known farmer and legislator who served 16 years in the Oregon Senate, has offered \$1,000 if these gentlemen can substantiate their giveaway charges. It will be interesting to see how soon any of them collect the \$1,000.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to insert in the Record a portion of Mr. Gould Lincoln's The Political Mill column, as follows:

Former Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay gave up his Cabinet post not long ago to run for the Republican senatorial nomination in Oregon. If he wins the primary election May 18, he will be Senator Morse's opponent. The Oregon Senator has attacked President Eisenhower and Mr. McKay frequently, accusing them of giving away natural resources of the country to private interests.

A Pendleton, Oreg., rancher, Rex Ellis, has deposited a certified check of \$1,000 with E. C. Sammons, president of the United States National Bank in Portland, to be given to anyone "who can prove by due process of law that the President of the United States or Douglas McKay has committed fraud in any transaction or ruling made by the President or by the Secretary," giving away any part of the public domain.

Mr. Ellis said he was making the offer in the interest of fair play—and that he did not consider the charges made against General Eisenhower and Mr. McKay fair play. He wants Senator Morse or any one else making these charges to prove them "or admit they have been making false and malicious statements."

The Federal Civil Defense Administration

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN W. McCORMACK

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 9, 1956

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, last October, I attended in Boston the national conference of the United States Civil Defense Council, which is composed of city and county civil defense officials. At that time, I became impressed with the difficult job faced by some 400 State and local civil defense directors at the conference and by the overall responsibility of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

In order to help civil defense, and particularly its education and training program, which is of interest to all Americans, I introduced H. R. 10432, which will help develop national civil defense training schools. The following facts are of interest by way of background:

The Federal Civil Defense Administration expects to offer a graduate course during the coming months for civil defense command and staff personnel. Completion of this course will prepare a graduate to function effectively in an operational capacity during a civil de-

fense emergency, natural or manmade. The course will be about 3 months in length.

Experience with the 1-week courses which have been conducted since 1951, have shown that many civil defense officials at the State and local levels who should attend such courses are not able to do so because of their budgetary limitations. Passage of this bill will enable more State and local officials to attend, thus assuring a greater uniformity in organization and training in civil defense throughout the Nation. If this bill is not enacted, most civil defense officials who so badly need this training will be unable to attend and the civil defense effort will be seriously handicapped.

The bill recommends payment of travel expenses and per diem allowances in accordance with Government travel regulations. Enactment of the bill would result in no additional increase in the Federal Civil Defense Administration's budget as the cost of the program would be absorbed in FCDA's 1957 appropriation.

Address of Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PATRICK J. HILLINGS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 7, 1956

Mr. HILLINGS. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call the attention of the House to a speech by Hon. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on April 13, 1956. Mr. Dulles' excellent and expert analysis of the recent change in the Communist Party line is worthy of careful study.

The address follows:

PURGE OF STALINISM

(Address of Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, before Los Angeles World Affairs Council, April 13, 1956)

There is never a dull moment in my job as Director of Central Intelligence. Events which seem to defy analysis happen somewhere in the world every day. Few trends seem to follow a predictable course.

These last few weeks there have been developments in the Soviet Union which have puzzled all the experts who generally have ready answers—sometimes more ready than accurate—to explain Soviet conduct.

Just at a time when some are saying that everything is going wrong with foreign policy in the free world countries but that everything in the Soviet Union is progressing according to some great master design, the Soviet collective leadership, as they call it, comes forward to beat their collective breasts and indulge in the most extreme self criticism.

The men in the Kremlin now tell us that all they said earlier about events in the U. S. S. R. during the 20 years preceding Stalin's death is quite wrong; that in fact this was an era of infamy, crime, and shame. They admit that their past adulation of Stalin was based on fear not on fact. The man they themselves used to call the "glorious Stalin, genius of mankind" is now being publicly accused of "grave errors" and privately described as a malicious monster.

The Soviet leaders do not very clearly explain why the new collective leaders waited for 3 years after Stalin's death to tell it to their people. They do not make a very satisfactory showing as to why they themselves sat acquiescent in the seats of the mighty during all the period of Stalin's dictatorship, exercising great powers as members of his inner circle.

Possibly, as Khrushchev is reported to have admitted, the price of nonconformity was a bullet in the head. This is a very human excuse but a poor qualification for high office on the part of those who now assert the rights and prerogatives of leadership. In the free world, where we aspire to build on the great traditions of the past, not to repudiate them, we revere as our heroes and leaders those who refused to conform, whatever the risks, when the principles of liberty were at stake.

In the U. S. S. R., evidently, acquiescing in crime as the price of simple survival under a political tyrant is sanctioned as legitimate conduct. As they put it: "The point was not to save one's own life; the point was to save the revolution."

Before going further into the details of this strange development in the Soviet Union it may be worth while to review briefly what had been taking place there during the years of Stalin's power. Here we may find clues as to why the men in the Kremlin now take the serious risks of repudiating their late hero for having put the individual above party and substituting a personal dictatorship for a collective one.

Stalin himself ran through a series of revolutionary combinations, somewhat akin to collective leaderships, during the 1920's. For example, in 1924-25 he combined with Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky. From 1925-27, a new alliance between Stalin, Bukharin and Rykov was formed and routed a Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev combination. And finally, from 1927-29, Stalin worked with Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and others to crush Stalin's recent allies, Bukharin and Rykov.

It was during the 10 years which preceded Russia's entry into World War II that Stalin completed the consolidation of his control over the Communist party machinery. By that time he had placed his loyal stooges in all important positions of authority throughout the Soviet Union and the Army was brought under political control.

Among the major charges said to have been leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev is the charge that in the late thirties he deliberately liquidated Marshal Tukhachevsky and thousands of the best officers in the Soviet Army, presumably to insure his political control of the military apparatus. Certainly today there is good reason to believe that Marshal Tukhachevsky was falsely accused of conspiring with the Germans. There is some evidence that there was a clever German plot to discredit Tukhachevsky, which happened to fit in with Stalin's own plans.

We do know that during and after the war there was burning resentment among the Soviet's professional soldiers at Stalin's interference in the conduct of the war, his unjust and capricious belittling of heroes such as Zhukov and his arrogant claims to personal credit for Soviet victories. A senior Soviet general, for example, is recently reported as having privately branded their so-called documentary film, "The Fall of Berlin," which shows Stalin as the great military master mind, as a "tissue of lies."

Today the collective dictatorship is assiduously repairing the injured dignity of the military and incorporating its leadership into Communist Party membership. They must realize that, following the usual pattern of revolutions, the military leaders might tire of being the pawn of dictators, whether individual or collective.

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But whatever the faults of Stalin in the prewar decade, one can hardly ascribe them to his old age or senility. Stalin was then in his prime. Furthermore one can hardly believe that the acts of the dictator in a war from which he emerged as a hero are the motivating causes for the present attempt to liquidate his memory. In fact, the most recent Soviet pronouncements are tending to refer to "good" and "bad" Stalin eras. Naturally, there is no desire to repudiate such measures as farm collectivization and the rapid industrialization under the Five Year Plans, which are so closely associated with his name. The beginning of the "bad" period was in 1934 when the great Stalin purges began. If they denounce his war record, the purpose here must be to eliminate him from the hero class and to give the military some of the credit he had arrogated to himself.

But to find the real reasons for the de-Stalinization campaign, we must, I believe, look to the more recent past, particularly to the hard autocratic period during the last 6 or 7 years of Stalin's life. Here we find two major motivations for cutting away from Stalin worship.

Internationally, from about 1947 onward to the time of his death, Stalin's often bellicose policy in the international field had been a failure and had tended to unite the free world against international communism. Domestically during this period his police state was meeting ever-increasing disfavor, not only with the helpless people, but with the top politicians, generals, and industrial managers who were essential to the working of the Soviet system. This began to create problems for the regime.

First, let us look at the international picture. In the immediate postwar era, riding the crest of the common victory and maintaining military strength and power, Soviet policy had notable successes. It consolidated the grip on the European satellites and helped the Chinese Communists to victory.

But beginning with about 1947 in Europe, somewhat later in Asia, the free world at last began to realize the implications of the forward drive of international communism and started to take countermeasures, and the tide began to turn.

What happened in these years? The Marshall plan, which Stalin and Molotov indignantly rejected and tried to defeat, was put into effect and Europe was saved from economic chaos. In Greece, the Soviet effort to take over by guerrilla tactics was thwarted.

When the Soviet attempted to take over Berlin and destroy this outpost of Western freedom, the Berlin blockade was frustrated by the airlift and West Berlin remains a showwindow of what the free world can do. Tito survived his ejection from the Cominform and the wrath of Stalin and struck back with telling criticisms of Stalinist policy—almost identical with what Soviet leaders are now themselves saying.

Later the North Atlantic Alliance was organized and despite Soviet threats the way was opened for German rearmament in close union with the West.

Thus frustrated in the European field Stalin turned to the Far East and, working with the North Korean and Chinese Communists, attempted to take over Korea as the first step toward driving America from the western Pacific. Again the Communists were blocked and, most important of all, an alarmed and awakened American public opinion proceeded to the defensive rearmament of this country. Our nuclear power was vastly increased.

It is understandable that Stalin's successors should have found it convenient to place upon him the blame for Greece, Berlin, Korea, Yugoslavia, German rearmament and the like, and in particular, for the generally hard Soviet line which has led to the buildup of American defense forces and NATO. It

was these successes which led the Soviet Union to conclude that a peace treaty with Austria was necessary to build up their badly shattered reputation as peace mongers and to prepare the way for a summit conference, their pilgrimage of penitence to Belgrade, and their effort to line the Socialist parties into new popular fronts.

But the foreign scene, alone, by no means explains the urge the present Kremlin leaders felt to break with the hard Stalinist past. They were already making progress in allowing the memory of Stalin to fade in international recognition and prestige without going to the extreme of total destruction of the Stalin myth with their own people. Thus the clue to their present policy lies more in the internal Soviet situation than in the requirements of their foreign policy.

Domestically they have been caught in a dilemma. In order to compete with the western world in the fields of science and industry which was vitally important for their economic growth and their rearmament program, it was essential for the Soviet to speed up the education of their people, especially in the scientific and technical field. After Stalin's death the regime encouraged more objectivity in scientific inquiry, and put on the shelf some pseudo scientists such as Lysenko. After all they had found, out early in the game that in the present nuclear age one could not fool around with scientists who tailored their art to the whims of Marxism.

Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not limit their educational processes to the scientific fields and more and more young men and women are graduating from schools, which correspond to our high schools and colleges, and are taking advanced degrees comparable to our degrees of master of arts and doctor of philosophy. Even with all the indoctrination in Communist teachings which they give to their young students it is impossible to prevent education from developing the critical faculties which every thinking human being possesses.

Furthermore, as part of their new campaign of sweetness and light, they have found it wise to take down some of the bars which have impeded travel between the Soviet Union and the free countries; and while the Iron Curtain still remains and there is a careful selective process as to those who are permitted to leave the Soviet Union or to visit it, it is obvious that today there is far more contact between the people of the U. S. S. R. and outside countries than at any time in recent years.

All this has tended to build up pressures upon the Soviet rulers to create an impression not only internationally but also domestically, that a dictatorship of the Stalin type was dead forever.

The Soviet leaders are trying to meet their external and internal dilemmas by finding a convenient "devil" which they can use to explain away past Soviet sins to the world abroad and to their own people as well as to demonstrate that the present rulers of the Soviet are different mentally and morally than they were under Stalin. Thus they hope that their own people will accept their protestations that the days of government by arbitrary policymaking, secret trials, deportations, and prison camps are over. Furthermore, they are again promising that they will do something to raise the standard of living so that the promise of individual freedom will be seasoned with a greater share of consumers goods and a more abundant life.

The extent of the opposition to the Stalinist type regime must have been gaged by the Kremlin as far stronger and deeper among the Russian people than we had dared to hope. Nonetheless, the destruction of the Stalin myth carries with it a very real threat to the internal discipline and unity of the Soviet Communist Party and the international Communist movement.

That calculated risk must have been taken deliberately by men who knew they had to have a scapegoat, if they were to hope to preserve the dictatorship on which their own power and very survival rested. By attacking the personal symbol of Stalin and the worst excesses of his rule, they hope to be able to preserve many of the essentials of the Stalinist system, now labelling it Leninism, the monopoly of all power by a single party, the complete subordination of the courts and individual rights to arbitrary party decree, the governmental control of the press and of all organs of public information.

This basic structure is meant to be preserved intact. Already the regime has publicly warned that some rotten elements have taken the de-Stalinization campaign too literally and are "trying to question the correctness of the party's policy." This, Pravda thundered, is "petty bourgeois licentiousness" of a kind the "party has never tolerated and will never tolerate." A dead and dishonored Stalin, therefore, is likely to be merely a device—here possibly a Trojan corpse rather than a Trojan horse—with which the long-suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived in their expectation of a freer and better life.

Obviously the Soviet rulers concluded that it would take something more than a mere repetition of the old clichés to have any effect. Apparently the necessity was deemed to be urgent and impelling. They had tried to do the trick with the liquidation of Beria, but the secrecy surrounding his execution was hardly a persuasive bit of evidence of a new dawn of liberty. It was in the worst tradition of the Stalin era, and he, after all, generally gave his victims at least a drum-head public trial.

When the present Soviet leaders took the risks involved in their present policy, they must have carefully weighed the consequences. They must have realized the grave issues it would raise in the Communist world outside of the U. S. S. R., among the party faithful in every free country, and among their own peoples.

Abroad they probably hoped there would be some counterbalancing advantages. If it would bring about a feeling of relaxation in the free world, defensive rearmament here and among our allies might slow down, defensive alliances might tend to weaken, the possibility of peaceful coexistence, for which everyone yearns, might be more and more accepted. All this they hoped would give them time to build up their own strength, economic, and military. If we are naive, then the Soviet Union may get some international benefits from their present tactics.

But there is another side to the picture which bears pondering. The Soviet leaders may have had no real alternative and took the course which they felt held out the best chance of keeping their own power. The Kremlin leaders, as I mentioned, were under heavy domestic pressures to do something to persuade their people that a new era was in the making. During recent years the leavening process of education has developed the critical faculties of millions of Russians. The Kremlin can no longer sell the old line to all of their people. They must now rewrite not only the history of Stalin but rewrite the story they have been telling their people about the outside world.

These leaders—Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich—have got over the hump of Stalin's death without losing their grip on his power. They profess a great deal of confidence in their ability to perpetuate the system of collective dictatorship they have instituted by basing it more broadly on the top layer of elite party managers, generals, engineers, and intellectuals who have a stake in the Soviet regime.

Only time can tell whether the present leaders with their past close association with Stalinism really can do this and make the

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